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Abstract 
 
Conflict-affected spaces that are far from exhibiting a Weberian monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force have been categorised as ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states for years. 
However, there is a growing tendency to understand conflicts as a form of order and 
to adapt the definition of statehood accordingly. But while the post-Weberian 
approaches indeed help to overcome some of the flaws of the dominant understanding 
of statehood, they do not substantively consider the role of legitimacy. The 
statebuilding discourse illustrates the problematic implications of the limited 
understanding of legitimacy on the policy level. In response, this paper suggests in 
line with post-Weberian scholars to understand political order as a field with multiple 
authorities but to consider both force and legitimacy as sources underpinning 
obedience to social control. An analytical framework is developed that acknowledges 
multiple dimensions of legitimacy as well as its dynamics. This framework may help 
to analyse legitimacy in empirical cases to inductively advance the theoretical 
understanding of legitimacy and to enable statebuilding which strengthens those 
authorities and institutions that are actually considered to be legitimate.  
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Introduction 
 
Whether we look at Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria or Yemen – many contemporary 
violent conflicts appear to be chaotic. They often involve numerous armed groups 
with changing alliances, acting across national borders and causing a large number of 
civilian deaths over an endless period of time. Conflicts look like an antithesis of the 
state. By definition, under such circumstances, a Weberian 'monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force' cannot exist. Thus spaces that are characterised by 
large-scale violent conflict are often considered to be 'fragile' or ‘failed' states (e.g. 
Fukuyama 2004; Rotberg 2004). But despite the chaotic façade of contemporary 
violent conflicts, some kind of rational or order can often be identified (e.g. Kaldor 
2006; Keen 2008). Accordingly, also some political theorists try reconceptualising 
statehood to include spaces, which are far from exhibiting a monopoly of force (e.g. 
Boege et al. 2008; Migdal/Schlichte 2005). But whereas Weber defines modern 
statehood on the basis of a monopoly of both force and legitimacy, the role of 
legitimacy is neglected in contemporary approaches of conceptualising statehood. 
However, in the context of violent conflict not only the role of force but also the one 
of legitimacy may be different from an ideal-typical Weberian state. As legitimacy is 
the normative connection between people and the political order they live in, this is 
not only a theoretical shortcoming but also one which resonates with peace- and 
statebuilding policies. Policy makers have recognised that the main challenge in 
supposedly ‘failed states’ is the construction of legitimacy. For instance, the World 
Development Report 2011 argues that “institutional legitimacy is the key to stability” 
(World Bank 2011: xi). Nevertheless, policies of constructing legitimacy in conflict-
torn settings have rarely been successful so far. 
 
In response to this conceptual problem and its policy implications this paper sets out 
to deductively develop a better conceptual understanding of legitimacy in the political 
order of conflict-torn spaces and to suggest a framework for the analysis of empirical 
cases. First of all, I provide an overview on the dominant approaches of 
conceptualising the political order of conflict-torn spaces. I argue that these 
approaches do not consider legitimacy in a substantive way. In a second step I 
therefore outline what we know about ‘legitimacy’ and what different ways there are 
of understanding it. On the basis of the literature on statebuilding, I then illustrate that 
not substantively considering legitimacy when thinking about political order is not 
only an academic problem but one which translates into the policy world. Last but not 
least, I connect the different strands of literature and deductively develop a conceptual 
understanding of legitimacy in conflict-torn spaces. Building on scholars such as 
Migdal and Schlichte (2005) I look at political order as a field of power with multiple 
authorities. Considering both Weber and Bourdieu, I suggest acknowledging 
legitimacy and force as two sources of authority. Thereby, I define legitimacy as an 
empirical phenomenon with different dimensions that should be distinguished in any 
analysis: i) multiple authorities constituting different referent objects; ii) differences 
between the claim of legitimacy of an authority and the perceived legitimacy of the 
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subjects; iii) differences of perception depending on the audience; iv) different 
degrees of legitimacy and v) differences between substantive sources of legitimacy, 
which are underpinned by shared values – such as tradition and rational-legality as 
suggested by Weber – and more instrumental sources, which respond to shared needs 
– such as security. Investigating the transformation of these sources over time can 
particularly help to understand the construction of legitimacy. Differentiating the five 
outlined dimensions in future empirical research may contribute to gaining a better 
understanding of legitimacy in conflict-torn spaces inductively and thereby provide a 
basis for policies aimed at strengthening legitimate actors and institutions. 
 
 
Ways of Understanding the Political Order of Conflict-torn Spaces 
 
The dominant lens to describe political order is hierarchical and state-centric: one 
usually looks at cities within a province, provinces within a state and states within the 
regional and global order. Thereby, particularly the role of the state is emphasised. 
This certainly makes sense as our world is organised in de jure states. However, 
conceptually speaking, it is not clear what kind of polity the term 'state' describes. 
Most scholars adopt a Weberian definition. But this understanding of political order 
fails to describe and analyse conflict-torn spaces, which are far from exhibiting a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. Building on Bourdieu, ‘post-
Weberian’ scholars suggest understanding political order as a field of power with 
multiple competing authorities. This understanding of the state overcomes many flaws 
of the dominant definition as it applies to any polities, independently of the degree of 
monopolisation of force. But whereas Weber’s understanding of political order was 
not only based on force but also on legitimacy the latter aspect is subjugated in the 
post-Weberian approaches. 
 
The state is not only one of the most fundamental but also one of the most contested 
concepts in political science. Like every other concept in social science, the state is 
not a categorisation of stable objects but is an abstraction of unstable social systems. 
Drawing on Kuhn (2000 [1989]) this instability requires a constant hermeneutic 
reinterpretation, which makes it difficult to agree on a common understanding of what 
a ‘state’ is. Further thinking along Kuhn’s lines, the concept of the state illustrates 
well that political science is not a ‘normal science’ (2000 [1989]), as political 
scientists do not accumulate knowledge within one dominant paradigm but rather 
follow different guiding paradigms. However, even vastly different schools of thought 
tend to rely heavily on the concept of the ‘state’. Most definitions ascribe a certain 
generalised function to the state, according to an underlying ideology. For instance, 
Marxists often describe the state as an instrument for a class to dominate another 
(Burnham 2003). Miliband argues that the state "is primarily and inevitably the 
guardian and protector of the economic interests" (1969: 265). For Gramsci "the 
historical unity of the ruling classes is realized in the State" (1971: 52). In contrast, 
pluralists often define the state as a forum to find a compromise between different 
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interests (Burnham 2003). Dahl, for instance, points out that "state regulation is 
absolutely essential to ensure a reasonable level of market competition, to reduce the 
harm otherwise caused by unregulated firms and markets, and to insure a more just, or 
at least more acceptable, distribution of the benefits" (2006  72). 
 
Weber offers a definition which is different in kind. He emphasises that the state 
"cannot be defined in terms of ends, scarcely any task it has not taken in hand" (2009b 
[1948]: 77) but only "in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, namely the use of 
physical force (not the only means, but the specific one)" (ibid.). Thus Weber 
famously defines the modern state as "a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (ibid.). 
Weber’s work is analytically valuable as it is underpinned by the ideal to “interpret 
historical and social occurrences in terms of the prevailing value orientation that give 
them their meaning without imposing the investigator’s value judgment on them” 
(Blau 1963: 305), thus, to allow a value-free [wertfrei] analysis. For this purpose 
Weber establishes pure ‘ideal types’, which are methodological “utopia [that] cannot 
be found empirically anywhere in reality” (Weber 2011 [1904]: 90). It is important to 
note that Weber emphasises that ideal types fulfil an analytical purpose only, and are 
not necessarily ideal in a normative way (Weber 2011 [1904]: 98).  
 
Weber’s understanding of the state rests on his analysis of polities in Europe. 
Historically, the formation of the European states is closely associated with war. Tilly 
(1992) illustrates how wars contributed to the monopolisation of the legitimate use of 
physical force and formation of nation states in Western Europe, particularly the 
French state, from 1600 onward. His work builds on Elias' (1982 [1939]: 320-329) 
observation of a trend from monopoly-free competition towards the formation of 
monopolies of the legitimate use of force as well as economic means in Europe. 
Arguably, however, the European wars of the 17th and 18th century are different from 
contemporary forms of violent conflict. Many violent conflicts todays – which are 
also called 'new wars' (Kaldor 2006) or ‘endless wars’ (Keen 2008) – are more 
concerned with political control rather than military control, often have a global 
dimension and involve a plurality of groups, which partly control force (Kaldor 2006; 
Keen 2008). In addition, such wars have also blurred the distinction between 
organised crime, war and human rights violations (Kaldor 2006). And even though 
some scholars question the term ‘new wars’ (e.g. Kalyvas 2001; Pinker 2011), the 
impact of on-going globalisation cannot be denied. For instance, today’s wars fuel an 
economy which rests on human trafficking, taxation of humanitarian assistance as 
well as arms and drug trade that creates incentives to continue the conflict (Kaldor 
2006; Keen 2008). Kaldor concludes that in contrast to those wars, which contributed 
to state formation, new wars ‘unbuild’ the monopoly of the legitimate use of force of 
states. 
  
Indeed, by definition spaces which are characterised by this contemporary form of 
violent conflict lack a Weberian 'monopoly of the legitimate use of force'. And as the 
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Weberian ideal-typical definition of statehood is dominant and underpins the work of 
numerous scholars, including for example North (1981) and Evans, Rueschemeyer 
and Skocpol (1985), their theories are much more difficult to apply in such a context. 
As a consequence of the dominance of the Weberian understanding of statehood 
territories with a low degree of monopolisation of force are often considered to be 
'fragile' or 'failed' (e.g. Fukuyama 2004; Rotberg 2004). The concept of state 
'fragility', however, is a negative-definition and puts very different forms of political 
order into one category, which is defined only by the deviation from the Weberian 
ideal. It does not consider that with the absence of a monopoly of force spaces are not 
institution-free but are governed by a different set of institutions. For instance, Keen 
(2008) illustrates how violent conflicts can turn into a stable order with different 
political and economic arrangements compared to typical nation states. The notion of 
state 'fragility' is even more problematic in the policy world. Putzel points out that in 
the policy discourse 'fragility' is “used as a catch-all phrase for conflict, post-conflict, 
humanitarian crisis-prone or chronically poverty stricken states" (2010: 1). In 
addition, the application of derogatory labels to non-Weberian polities securitises the 
absence of Weberian institutions. Scholars such as Duffield (2001) and Bliesemann 
de Guevara and Kühn (2010) argue that the absence of a monopoly of force is often 
framed as a security risk in Western societies. Building on the Copenhagen School 
concept of ‘securitisation’ the establishment of the various labels of state ‘fragility’ 
can be seen as a way of constructing a security threat which generates “endorsement 
of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise apply” (Buzan/Waever/de 
Wilde 1998: 5). Thus defining states as ‘failed’ creates a discursive environment in 
which any form of intervention by external actors can be justified as a response.  
 
In response to the flaws of 'state fragility' there is an increasing amount of literature 
re-labelling and partly also re-conceptualising the political order of polities which are 
supposedly 'failed' (for overview see Hoffmann/Kirk 2013). A particularly prominent 
strand of literature suggests calling such arrangements 'hybrid political orders' (e.g. 
Boege et al. 2008; Luckham/Kirk 2012). This strand of literature is policy-focused 
and can be seen as a reaction to the perceived failure of dealing with state 
fragility. The idea of hybridity, originated in natural science, has been penetrating 
social science since the early 1990s. By now hybridity is commonly used to describe 
what results from the blurring of categorical borders. In biology hybridity describes 
the “offspring of two animals or plants of different species, or (less strictly) varieties” 
(Little et al. 1973: 1001). In social science the notion of hybridity was adopted to 
label “anything derived from heterogeneous sources” (ibid.) and the blurring or 
transcendence of borders in very different contexts. Scholars supporting this 
understanding emphasise that supposedly 'failed' states tend to involve a blurring of 
private and public as well as formal and informal. According to this literature people 
in ‘failed’ states are governed by a mixture of actors and overlapping institutions, 
comprising both public or formal Weberian institutions as well as different private or 
informal non-Weberian (‘non-state’) ones. 
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On the downside, however, the idea of ‘hybridity’ lacks analytical leverage. It still 
rests on ideal-typical categories, mistakenly indicates the existence of non-hybrid 
institutional settings and establishes a new broad label that brushes over fundamental 
differences between different hybrid arrangements. It has to be acknowledged that 
categorical borders can only be transcended in hybrid settings if there actually are 
ideal-typical categories. Thus, even though hybridity is meant to overcome conceptual 
binaries it actually reinforces them.  In order to describe, for example, how formal and 
informal institutions are combined in hybrid settings the empirical existence of the 
category ‘formal’ has to be accepted, which rests on the ideal-typical Weberian 
definition of the state. And as no existing state can be described as ‘truly’ Weberian 
no institutional setting can actually be characterised as ‘non-hybrid’. Thus hybridity is 
not a different or novel understanding of political order. In its most extreme form it 
only describes the absence of the Weberian state. Spivak, a scholar of Post-Colonial 
Studies, summarises that hybridity is “troublesome since it assumes there would be 
something that was not hybrid” (Spivak 1995, quoted in Hutnyk 1998: 414; see also 
Shome/Hedge 2002). The higher the degree of monopolisation of legitimate force, the 
lower is the degree of hybridity within a state. However, whereas the monopoly of 
force is a clear analytical ideal type, this does not apply to the concept of hybridity, 
which may exist in different forms. 
 
Another strand of literature on political order evolved in response to the perceived 
insufficiency of the contemporary understanding of statehood, making this strand 
more analytical and less concerned with policies than the literature which evolved out 
of the 'state fragility' debate. This strand of literature, implicitly or explicitly, often 
considers Bourdieu's understanding of order to better conceptualise statehood and can 
therefore be considered ‘post-Weberian’. Bourdieu (1994) argues that societies 
consist of various fields in which power is concentrated (e.g. economy, politics, 
universities). According to Bourdieu the linkages between the fields constitute a field 
of power. The field of power describes the "arena where holders of the various kinds 
of capital compete" (Wacquant 1996: xi). The 'post-Weberian' concepts are Weberian 
in the sense that they acknowledge the importance of force within a given territory. 
But as they also adopt Bourdieu's more dynamic notion of competition within a field 
of power, they consider the political order to be in a process of permanent 
transformation and ultimately give more space to agency and plural authorities. 
 
Post-Weberian definitions are useful to understand political order as they describe 
polities regardless of the extent to which they have features that are similar to the 
Weberian ideal type. Hence, this conception of the state is also well suited to study 
supposedly 'fragile' or 'failed' polities, which do not have a monopoly of force because 
of violent conflict among other reasons. For instance, Migdal and Schlichte (2005) 
define the state as “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence” (2005: 
15). This field of power is constantly changing as “the process in which power is 
exercised involves a constant struggle among multiple actors” (ibid.). The definition 
even allows us to see resistance against domination – as for instance outlined by Scott 
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(1985) – as a part of statehood. But while this understanding helps to grasp spaces 
independently of the degree of monopolisation of force they ignore what, according to 
Weber, is the second central feature of statehood apart from force: legitimacy. Hence, 
the new approaches to conceptualising political order raise the question of what 
happens to legitimacy in the absence of a Weberian monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force. 
 
 
Ways of Understanding Legitimacy 
 
Emphasising the role of legitimacy raises the question of what the concept actually 
describes and what underpins its importance. Derived from the Latin word 'legitimus' 
(lawful, legal, legitimate) its definition has changed constantly and is used in a wide 
range of different contexts (Delbrück 2003: 31). In medieval European thought, for 
instance, it described a person who – in contrast to the tyrant – ruled according to the 
law and the will of God (ibid.). Building on Rawls (1971) and Dworkin (1977) it is 
useful to distinguish concepts from conceptions. Concepts define the ideal abstract 
meaning of a term, conceptions are the multiple possible instantiations, establishing 
under what conditions the term may be used. For instance, Rawls suggests defining 
the concept of justice "by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in 
defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an 
interpretation of this role" (1971: 9). 'Fairness' then might be a conception of justice. 
Similarly, different concepts and conceptions of legitimacy can be distinguished. 
  
Usually two different concepts of legitimacy are differentiated: normative as well as 
empirical legitimacy (Andersen 2012; Schmelzle 2011; Hinsch 2008). Krasner and 
Risse point out that the literature on legitimacy often "does not distinguish 
adequately" (2014: 11) between these concepts. Philosophers and political theorists 
usually discuss under what conditions a political order or an authority can be 
considered to be legitimate (Jackson/Bradford). There is an on-going debate on the 
requirements, which have to be fulfilled to achieve such a normative legitimacy. For 
example, Arendt argues that "power springs up whenever people get together and act 
in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than 
from any action that then may follow" (1969: 52). Conversely, most scholars in 
political science and sociology conducting empirical research adopt an empirical view 
of legitimacy (Dodgan 2002: 120). The empirical concept of legitimacy rests on 
Weber's understanding and his general approach to make research as independent as 
possible from the researcher's own views and values (Beetham 1991a). According to 
Weber "the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of 
willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising 
authority are lent prestige" (Weber 1964: 382). He assumes that while voluntary 
obedience is necessary to ensure the stability of any political order on the long-term 
only empirical legitimacy makes people willing to do so. Hence, in an ideal-typical 
state the monopoly of force also has to be legitimate from the point of view of the 
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people governed. When investigating empirical legitimacy, the attitudes and beliefs of 
people have to be analysed. Beetham summarises the difference: "For the political 
philosopher, power is legitimate if it meets certain standards of the right and the good, 
and the philosopher's concern is to clarify these standards and show how they can be 
justified. For the social and political scientist, in contrast, power is legitimate if it is 
acknowledged as rightful by those involved in a given power relation, even if it does 
not meet standards which he or she would personally endorse" (2013: x). 
 
In research practice, the two conceptions often overlap. On the one hand, some 
political theorists claim that an authority is legitimate if people perceive it to be 
legitimate, hence, adopting an empirical definition for normative legitimacy. On the 
other hand, empirical research on legitimacy always has a normative component. 
Even though legitimacy does not need to be conceptualised in detail for investigating 
other people's understandings the analysis is always framed by the researcher's own 
definitions. For instance, when operationalizing legitimacy and choosing certain 
questions to investigate the concept, the researcher decides what normatively 
constitutes legitimacy. "Since the normative beliefs of citizens and the moral 
judgments of philosophers refer to the same phenomenon" (Schmelzle 2011: 7), 
normative and empirical legitimacy actually are not two different concepts of 
legitimacy, but only constitute two perspectives on the same concept. Nevertheless, 
heuristically distinguishing between empirical and normative perspectives on 
legitimacy remains helpful to avoid conceptual confusion. 
 
In addition, different conceptions of legitimacy have to be distinguished. These 
conceptions describe the multiple possible instantiations, establishing under what 
conditions it is adequate to use the term legitimacy. Thus, conceptions can also be 
seen as different sources of legitimacy. Most famously Weber distinguishes between 
rational-legal, charismatic and traditional legitimacy, underpinning the belief in the 
right to exercise social control (2009b [1948]: 78-79). The idea of rational-legal 
legitimacy rests on the belief in formal rules and a functioning bureaucracy. Thus, 
such legitimacy can be embodied in certain sets of institutions. This could, for 
instance, be a democratic system where the 'input' (Scharpf 1997) of the subjects 
influences the shape and behaviour of the system according to their interests and 
values. Traditional legitimacy is based on customs and routines, legitimising authority 
because it has not changed for a long period of time. A particularly complex form of 
legitimacy is charisma. For Weber charisma rests on the belief of people in the extra-
ordinary [außeralltägliche] qualities of an individual, which makes him or her appear 
to be an envoy of God, a role-model or leader (Weber 2009a: 222-224; Kraemer 
2002: 174). According to Weber charisma can also be normalised [Veralltäglichung]. 
Whereas extra-ordinary charisma characterises people or ideas that appear to 
revolutionise order from the inside, normalised charisma describes a stabile order 
which developed from charisma (Bliesemann de Guevara/Reiber 2011: 30). However, 
Beetham (1991b, 1993, 2013) challenges these Weberian conceptions of legitimacy. 
He points out that Weber's definition "reduces legitimacy from a complex of factors 
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which give people good grounds for compliance, to a single dimension: their 'belief in 
legitimacy'" (2013: 23). Beetham therefore suggests to re-define: "a given power 
relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it 
can be justified in terms of their beliefs" (2013: 11). Accordingly he defines three 
universal components that can underpin legitimacy: "that power should be acquired 
and exercised according to established rules; that the rules should be justifiable by 
reference to shared beliefs; and that there should be appropriate actions expressive of 
consent on the part of those qualified to give it" (Beetham 1993: 488). Algappa on the 
contrary, supports Weber and counters Beetham's critique. He argues that "legal 
validity and consent are not independent of belief" (1995: 14). But in contrast to 
Weber he distinguishes four different elements/sources of legitimacy: "normative 
(shared norms and values), procedural (conformity to established rules), performance 
(proffer and effective use of state power), and consent elements" (1995: 24). However 
the conceptions of legitimacy are defined, most scholars agree that they are not static 
but subject to constant change. On the one hand, the reference objects in the political 
order may change. On the other hand, building on Algappa, needs, "norms and values 
may change as a result of political, socioeconomic, and ideational changes" (1995: 
25). Hence, legitimacy is always in a process of transformation, construction and 
deconstruction.  
 
Distinguishing concepts from conceptions sets the frame for understanding legitimacy 
and illustrates the importance of working with exact definitions to avoid confusion. 
Adopting an empirical understanding of legitimacy, as suggested by Weber, allows us 
to investigate the sources of legitimacy in case studies. But the conceptual literature 
on legitimacy does not address and has not been adapted to the complexities and 
dynamics of conflict-torn spaces that are far from exhibiting a monopoly of force.  
 
 
Policy Implications – The Difficulties of Building a Legitimate Political Order 
 
The unsatisfactory understanding of the role of legitimacy in conflict-torn spaces can 
easily be dismissed as an abstract scholarly problem. But the literature on 
statebuilding illustrates that this problem also translates into the policy world. Even 
though the ideas of how to build a state differ, all approaches rest on a preconceived 
idea of what institutional result is supposedly legitimate. This shows that an improved 
conceptual understanding of legitimacy in conflict-torn spaces is not only relevant for 
purely academic reasons but may, for instance, also help to guide future statebuilding 
policies in achieving more legitimate results. 
 
Political order and legitimacy can be considered to be in a process of constant change 
and transformation (Tilly 1992; Elias 1982 [1939]). Obviously many actors try to 
influence or even steer these transformative processes, constructing specific kinds of 
political order and/or producing legitimacy. Particularly prominent in the policy 
domain is the idea of 'statebuilding', which - as the name indicates - aims at the 
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construction of a predefined kind of political order. The discourse on state ‘failure’ 
illustrates that even in academia the prevailing understanding of the state rests on a 
problematic normative-teleological misinterpretation of Weber’s ideal-typical modern 
state. Many scholars actually prescribe how a ‘Weberian state’ can be created in the 
context of state ‘failure’ or state ‘fragility’ (e.g. Fukuyama 2004; Rotberg 2004). 
Lemay-Hébert (2013) describes this trend as 'neo-Weberianism'. The current 
academic debate on statebuilding is divided along the lines of sequencing – 
discussing, for example if economic liberalisation or institutionalisation is required in 
a first step (Schneckener 2007) – but widely agrees on the institutional results which 
statebuilding is supposed to achieve. Statebuilding rests on the normative assumption 
that certain kinds of institutions are naturally legitimate or can achieve legitimacy by 
performing well. For example, Fukuyama points out that in “today’s world the only 
serious source of legitimacy is democracy” (2004: 35). But the assumption that only a 
Western-type ‘strong’ state is fully legitimate and can produce legitimate results 
neglects the reality of diverse non-Western governance arrangements. It is also 
ignored that the wide-spread existence of Weberian states is not necessarily a 
consequence of their general acceptance only but also has its roots in European 
colonialism, when Weberian state structures were imposed on societies around the 
world (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010: 34-36). The on-going implicit idea of 
superiority in terms of state structures translates into the implementation phase of 
building Weberian states. Institutions that are in place in a ‘fragile’ state are usually 
ignored. Thus, for instance, local power relationships and certain histories of 
governance in societies are often not considered in a substantive way but are only 
seen as retrograde or underdeveloped institutions, which have to be eliminated 
(Jackson 2011: 1807). The assumption allows a technocratic implementation of 
statebuilding policies but may result in what is called ‘quasi-state’ (Jackson 1990), 
‘phantom state’ (Chandler 2006) or ‘empty shell’ (Lemay-Hébert 2009) – states 
which have a Weberian façade but are governed by a very different set of institutions. 
 
In response to the failure of this dominant approach to statebuilding the idea of 
conceptualising failed states as 'hybrid' evolved. But the idea of 'hybrid governance' is 
not only used to describe political order but has also found its way into the 
prescriptive statebuilding discourse. Several scholars (e.g. Menkhaus 2006/2007; 
Boege et al. 2008) suggest hybridity as an alternative to imposing Weberian structures 
in statebuilding. For example, Menkhaus emphasises that an improved approach to 
statebuilding “would combine what is already working locally with what is essential 
nationally” (2006/2007: 103). According to Menkhaus legitimate local actors should 
provide security and other core services, limiting the central state to “essential 
competencies not already provided by local, private sector, or voluntary sector actors” 
(ibid.). For future statebuilding efforts Boege et al. suggest “combining state 
institutions, customary institutions and new elements of citizenship and civil society 
in networks of governance which are not introduced from the outside, but embedded 
in the societal structures on the ground” (2008: 17).  
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The recognition of the failures of the prevailing statebuilding policies is worthy of 
support. But the hybrid alternative of transforming political orders is problematic as 
well. It is also based on the assumption that certain institutions are more legitimate 
than others. Compared to traditional statebuilding it only suggests a different pre-
defined institutional result, which needs to be achieved. For example, Menkhaus 
(2006/2007) assumes that a ‘mediated’ state is most legitimate while Boege et al. 
(2008) suggests locally ‘embedded’ (Boege et al. 2008) arrangements, which combine 
different institutions. By making assumptions about what kind of institutional 
arrangement is legitimate the descriptive idea of hybridity, which acknowledges 
complexity, is turned into a new normatively prescriptive concept. In comparison to 
‘neo-Weberian’ approaches it only changes the goalpost of what kind of institutional 
framework statebuilding is supposed to achieve. This is problematic as ‘traditional’ or 
‘local’ institutions are actually not always characterised by a high degree of 
legitimacy. Firstly, ’informal', 'traditional' and 'local' are not homogenous categories 
but can include very different institutions with varying degrees of legitimacy. 
Secondly, some informal institutions that are considered to be ‘traditional’ or ‘local’ 
were actually imposed by colonial rulers as oppressive instruments (e.g. Allen 2007). 
Hence, the pragmatic suggestion of building hybrid institutional arrangements is 
based on questionable assumptions about legitimacy and narrowly focuses on 
institutional results. This may lay the foundations for a new blueprint in statebuilding 
practice assuming that ‘mediated’, ‘embedded’ or ‘local’ institutions – rather than 
‘formal’, ‘democratic’ or ‘rational-legal’ ones – are ‘good’ institutions. An improved 
understanding of the role of legitimacy in the political order of conflict-torn spaces 
that builds on empirical analysis and acknowledges the specificities of each case 
would help to avoid such blueprints and to develop policies that strengthen what is 
considered to be legitimate by the group of people targeted.  
 
 
Conceptual and Analytical Suggestions 
 
Acknowledging the Dynamics of the Political Order of Conflict-torn Spaces 
 
In response to the limited understanding of legitimacy in the political order of 
conflict-torn spaces I deductively develop a conceptual framework, which considers 
the role of legitimacy more substantively. I suggest adopting a post-Weberian 
understanding of political order as field of multiple authorities but argue that 
legitimacy plays a key role in these dynamics as another source of authority enabling 
the exercise of social control besides force. 
 
Migdal and Schlichte's (2005) conception of the state as a constantly changing field of 
power, constituted by competing actors, provides a useful framework for the analysis 
of polities, far away from the Weberian ideal-typical state because of violent conflict 
among other reasons. To capture the ‘state’s dynamics’ analytically, they suggest 
contrasting the image of the state, as the legitimate rule-maker of a territory, with its 
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actual practices (2005: 14-19). They emphasise that such an analysis has to be about 
processes and change rather than static snapshots (ibid.: 19-20). For an investigation 
of the changing practices I suggest, in line with Lund (2006), to look at the history 
and present of various authorities within the arena of competition that may be called 
'state'. As Agnew points out, "political authority is not restricted to states and (…) is 
thereby not necessarily exclusively territorial" (2005: 441). Hence, choosing authority 
as the unit of analysis allows more flexibility in dealing with the globalised world 
order (see Kaldor 2009). While adopting this understanding the divide between 
global, national and local does not matter. 
 
My understanding of authority is influenced by the German term ‘Herrschaft’, 
suggesting an analysis of governance beyond government. Weber defines 'Herrschaft' 
as "the chance of a specific (or: of all) command(s) being obeyed by a specifiable 
group of people" (1980 [1921]: 122). ‘Herrschaft’ has no equivalent in English as 
terms like power, authority and domination usually describe slightly different 
phenomena (Beetham 1991: 35). I use the expression ‘authority’ to describe social 
control both as a vertical relationship of command and obedience and, accordingly, 
the (commanding) actor or entity to whose social control a group of people obeys, 
thus having a structuring influence on their lives.  
 
Whereas Migdal and Schlichte’s understanding of political order is based on the "use 
and threat of violence" (2005: 15) I acknowledge in line with Weber the relevance of 
not only force but also of empirical legitimacy for political order. I assume that both 
force and legitimacy may enable an authority to exercise social control, constituting 
two, not mutually exclusive but closely linked sources of authority. Similarly 
Casinelli (1961) argues that obedience to social control can have two reasons, 
constituting two dimensions or sources of authority. On the one hand, obedience can 
result coercively from the 'exercise of authority', which Casinelli defines as the 
control or exercise of violence (the use of threats and physical coercion). This 
dimension of authority can be seen in line with the Weberian degree of 
(monopolisation of) force. On the other hand, obedience can be voluntary and result 
from the 'possession of authority', which reflects what Weber calls legitimacy. Weber 
(1980 [1921]: 122) points out that the belief in the legitimacy of an authority 
[Legitimitätsglauben] is actually necessary for a stable relationship. As any authority 
by definition exercises social control (which may also be considered to be exercise of 
authority) I call the two dimensions exercise of force and possession of legitimacy to 
avoid terminological confusion.  
 
However, while this definition appears to be similar to Weber's, an important 
difference to the dominant understanding of authority has to be noted. I do not put 
authority on par with legitimacy. Weber acknowledges that authority may rest on 
coercion alone, but points out that every authority ‘tries to create a belief in its 
legitimacy’. Similarly Arendt argues that "no government exclusively based on the 
means of violence has ever existed" (1969: 50). Conversely, I distinguish force and 
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legitimacy as two ideal-typical sources of authority. But this distinction is an 
analytical one only, which is supposed to enable gaining a better understanding of the 
relationship between these two concepts through empirical research. The analytical 
distinction therefore does not necessarily contradict Weber and Arendt’s conclusion.  
 
 
Describing the Role of Legitimacy 
 
This understanding of legitimacy as a source of authority in a dynamic political order 
is the backdrop for investigating the role of legitimacy in more detail. As deductive 
reasoning reaches its limits empirical research is necessary to better theorise the role 
of legitimacy inductively. An empirical analysis could help to understand if 
legitimacy indeed always plays a central role for any authority. Furthermore, an 
empirical analysis can shed light on how the two sources of authority, force and 
legitimacy, relate to each other and what shape authorities have (e.g. executive 
bodies, organisations, groups, individuals). Last but not least, investigating legitimacy 
in empirical cases is intrinsically valuable. Understanding the perceptions and 
expectations of the people in terms of legitimacy may, for example, help to transform 
political orders towards wider acceptance and stability. For this kind of analysis 
legitimacy has to be conceptualised empirically. Building on the existing literature on 
legitimacy (particularly Weber 2009b [1948], Beetham 1991b, 1993, 2013 and 
Alagappa 1995) I propose to distinguish a number of dimensions of legitimacy that 
help mapping and structuring legitimacy in empirical cases.  
 
i) Referent Object 
As the political order of conflict-torn spaces is not monopolised there are numerous 
and potentially very different kinds of authorities, which have to be considered as 
referent objects. The subjects’ perception of legitimacy may be linked to different 
aspects of each of these authorities: its specific characteristics (e.g. charisma or the 
communicated ideology that is perceived to be right), the history of how it gained its 
authority (e.g. perceived as ‘democratic’ or ‘traditional’) as well as its general 
behaviour including the experienced day-to-day practices (e.g. considered to be 
‘fair’). 
 
ii) Perspective 
Both Weber as well as Beetham’s understanding of empirical legitimacy is quite 
narrow. I acknowledge Beetham's critique that Weber's understanding reduces 
legitimacy to one dimension – the belief in legitimacy. But Beetham’s definition – 
resting on the justification of legitimacy – is similarly one-sided, particularly in 
conflict-torn spaces with multiple authorities and a high degree of legal pluralism. 
However, Weber and Beetham’s views are not mutually exclusive but can be 
combined. Hence, I propose to approach and analyse legitimacy from two 
perspectives: the perception of legitimacy, from the people’s point of view, as well as 
its justification, from the authority’s point of view.  
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iii) Audience 
When analysing the perception of legitimacy I suggest considering different groups 
within the audience. As Andersen (2012: 207) notes, legitimacy should be treated as 
"a qualitative phenomenon specific to distinct communities and their actions". The 
perception of legitimacy may differ because of varying attitudes and interests in 
different geographic and cultural contexts. 
 
iv) Degree 
Especially, but not exclusively, quantitative studies may investigate the degree of 
legitimacy, indicating the strength of belief. To ‘measure’ legitimacy it can be helpful 
to look at people’s behaviour towards an authority and distinguish between active 
support, passive support, passive resistance and active resistance.  
 
v) Sources  
The most complex aspect of legitimacy is its sources. I suggest distinguishing two 
dimensions of sources of legitimacy, which are based on different theoretical (but 
again empirically certainly overlapping) reasons for voluntary obedience. I term the 
rational assessment of usefulness of authority instrumental legitimacy, describing to 
what extent an authority responds to shared needs. Instrumental legitimacy is very 
much based on the perceived effectiveness of service delivery. Conversely, 
substantive legitimacy is a more abstract normative judgment, which is underpinned 
by shared values. If a person believes that an entity has the right to exercise social 
control, he or she may also accept personal disadvantages. Hence, with substantive 
legitimacy I describe the dominant Weberian understanding and categories of 
legitimacy (formal/rational-legal, traditional, charismatic) in political science. For 
example, the history of gaining authority might be perceived as legitimate if it is in 
line with what subjects consider to be democratic or traditional. Similarly the 
behaviour of an authority may be considered to be legitimate as it is in line with what 
is perceived to be traditionally right. However, it may also be perceived as wrong on 
the basis of the subjects’ values but still useful. In this case the behaviour is perceived 
to be only instrumentally but not substantially legitimate. 
 
In a rather simplistic way these dimensions can be summarised graphically in a 
framework (see Figure 1). Legitimacy can be either investigated top-down, looking at 
the authority’s claims and justifications, or bottom-up, looking at the subjects’ 
perceptions. The subjects perceive different facets of each authority: its specific 
characteristics (such as charisma or the communicated ideals and ideology), the 
history of how it gained authority and its past and present behaviour (or performance) 
in a general sense. In addition, authority and subjects may directly interact so that the 
subjects experience the authority’s practices. This interaction starts with certain 
expectations, has a process and ends with a result. All of these perceptions and 
experiences mix and are assessed on the basis of the subjects’ needs and values, 
resulting in a certain degree of an authority’s perceived instrumental and/or 
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substantive legitimacy. Conversely, one can adopt a top-down approach and analyse 
the claims and justifications of legitimacy expressed by an authority. These claims of 
legitimacy may be based on selected facets of authority, such as its behaviour, and 
justified with the authority’s expressed ideology and interests.   
 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining the Construction of Legitimacy 
 
When trying to understand the construction of legitimacy a closer look at the sources 
of legitimacy and their transformation over time is required. Legitimacy is dynamic, 
not generally 'belonging' to certain authorities or being embedded in specific 
institutions. The needs and values as well as the constellation of authorities within the 
political order – and consequently their legitimacy – vary temporally. For instance, 
what is perceived as 'traditional' may change over time. Instrumental legitimacy may 
become traditional or the importance of religion as a tradition may decrease. The 
transformation of legitimacy may happen undirectedly but actors may also 
consciously try to produce or generate legitimation. For instance, Levite and Tarrow 
argue that "dominant elites have a greater or a lesser degree of control over that 
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construction" (1983: 297).  
 
To empirically investigate the construction and deconstruction of legitimacy a more 
historical analysis is required. Such an analysis has to look at how authorities were 
perceived by different groups in the past and find the mechanisms that have caused a 
change of these perceptions. Theoretically speaking, for gaining instrumental 
legitimacy, the exercise of social control has to be matched with the needs of the 
people. And indeed, improving the service delivery of the state (e.g. security, health 
care) is a prominent strategy of 'statebuilding'. But the lack of sustainable success 
indicates that it remains unclear how instrumental legitimacy can be made more 
substantive. Constructing substantive legitimacy, which ensures stability of the 
political order, is challenging as it builds on beliefs rather than needs. Basically there 
are two influencing parameters for generating substantive legitimacy. On the one 
hand, authorities can adapt their way of exercising authority to the beliefs of the 
people. For instance, according to Scharpf (1997: 19), democracies may ensure 
substantive as well as instrumental legitimacy by incorporating the citizens’ 
preferences into decision making on the 'input' side and by ensuring effectiveness of 
the authority on the 'output' side (see also Boedeltje/Cornips 2004; Skogstad 2003). 
On the other hand, authorities may attempt to adjust the beliefs of the people to their 
way of exercising authority. Beetham argues that "among the powers any dominant 
group possesses will be the ability to influence the belief of others; and among the 
most important of such beliefs will be those that relate to the justification of their own 
power" (2013: 104).  
  
The literature on policing offers a first hypothesis on how the people’s beliefs and the 
exercise of authority can be aligned. Many scholars in this field emphasise the 
importance of procedure to generate legitimacy, which refers to the judgment on the 
way authority is exercised on a daily basis (e.g. Tyler 2004; Jackson et al. 2013; 
Mazerolle et al. 2013). For instance, an authority may be able to generate a certain 
degree of substantive legitimacy by providing justice in a way that is perceived to be 
fair even if the people do not agree on the rules, which underpin the judgement or the 
overall governing ideology. The post-structuralist literature indicates a second 
hypothesis: the importance of language and labels for constructing legitimacy – or 
what Hansen and Stepputat call the "conditions of possibilities of politics" (2001: 4). 
Language may make authority real and create legitimation. For instance, adopting 
religious terms, referring to traditions, emphasising successful service delivery and 
using the media as a multiplier may help authorities to influence the belief of others 
and justify their way of exercising social control. To investigate the relevance of such 
hypotheses and to develop new ideas, however, empirical research on legitimacy in 
conflict-torn settings is necessary. 
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Conclusions 
 
It can be concluded that the dominant ways of understanding political order are 
insufficient to describe the dynamics of conflict-torn spaces. The term ‘state fragility’ 
is a negative-definition that has no analytical leverage and may trigger problematic 
policies aiming at 'fixing' fragility to create a 'Weberian state'. But also the prominent 
new understanding of 'hybrid' governance is of limited analytical power. It is a new 
term to describe political orders with a low degree of monopolisation of force, but it is 
no new concept as such. Adopting a more dynamic ‘post-Weberian’ perspective and 
seeing political order as a field of power with multiple authorities, allows us to 
overcome these conceptual constraints. Nonetheless, this understanding does not 
substantively consider the role of legitimacy. The literature on statebuilding illustrates 
the problem of subjugating legitimacy and focusing on power relations only. 
 
Hence, I suggested considering both Bourdieu and Weber and to view political order 
as a field of multiple authorities with force and legitimacy underpinning the 
obedience to their social control. I further proposed a multi-dimensional framework 
for the analysis of empirical cases. For instance, I suggested distinguishing different 
sources of legitimacy, including instrumental and more substantive forms. Such an 
empirical analysis could help to further develop the theoretical understanding of 
legitimacy in the political order of conflict-torn spaces. Furthermore, this kind of 
analysis can provide an important foundation for statebuilding policies that strengthen 
those institutions that are actually considered to be legitimate by the people targeted. 
But there also are some limitations that need to be considered. The paper is based on 
deductive reasoning, building on Western schools of thought only. Hence the 
framework is not set in stone and should be seen as the explorative starting point not 
the result of an analysis of legitimacy in the political order of conflict-torn spaces. 
Conceptual work by people with a different socialisation as well as empirical research 
are necessary to overcome these flaws and would substantively contribute to 
improving the developed understanding of legitimacy in the political order of conflict-
torn spaces.  
 
 
Florian Weigand  20 
Bibliography 
  
Abrams, P. (1988 [1977]). Notes of the Difficulty of Studying the State. Journal of 
Historical Sociology 1(1): 58-89. 
  
Agnew, J. (2005). Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in 
Contemporary World Politics. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
95(2): 437–461. 
  
Alevsson, M. and Sköldberg, K. (2009). Reflexive Methodology. New Vistas for 
Qualitative Research. Second Edition. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi/Singapore: 
SAGE Publications. 
 
Algappa, M. (1995). The Anatomy of Legitimacy. In: Alagappa, M (ed.). Political 
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia. The Quest for Moral Authority. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.   
  
Algappa, M. (1995). The Bases of Legitimacy. In: Alagappa, M (ed.). Political 
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia. The Quest for Moral Authority. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Allen, T. (2007). The International Criminal Court and the Invention of Traditional 
Justice in Northern Uganda. Politique Africaine, 107: 147-166. 
 
Andersen, M. S. (2012). Legitimacy in State-Building: A Review of the IR 
Literature. International Political Sociology 6:  205-219.  
  
Arendt, H. (1969). On Violence. New York: Harcourt. 
 
Badie, Bertrand (2000). The Imported State. The Westernization of the Political 
Order. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
  
Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The Concept of Security. Review of International Studies, 23: 
5–26. 
 
Beetham, D. (2013). The Legitimation of Power. Second Edition. Houndsmills, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
  
Beetham, D. (1993). In Defence of Legitimacy. Political Studies, XLI: 488-491. 
  
Beetham, D. (1991a). Max Weber and the Legitimacy of the Modern State. Analyse 
& Kritik, 13: 34-45. 
  
Beetham, D. (1991b). The Legitimation of Power. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, London: Macmillan Education Ltd. 
  
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality. A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
  
Bhaskar, R. (1998). Philosophy and Scientific Realism. In: Archer, Margaret et. al 
Florian Weigand  21 
(eds.). Critical Realism. Essential Readings. Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
  
Blau, P. M. (1963). Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority. The American 
Political Science Review, 57(2): 305-316. 
  
Bliesemann de Guevara, B. and Reiber, T. (2011). Popstars der Macht: Charisma 
und Politik. In: Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit and Reiber, Tanja (eds.). Charisma und 
Herrschaft: Führung und Verführung in der Politik. Frankfurt am Main: Campus 
Verlag. 
  
Bliesemann de Guevara, B. and Kühn, F. P. (2010). Illusion Statebuilding – Warum 
sich der westliche Staat so schwer exportieren lässt. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. 
  
Boedeltje, M. and Cornips, J. (2004). Input and output legitimacy in interactive 
governance. Netherlands Institute for Government (NIG). NIG Annual Work 
Conference 2004. Rotterdam. 
  
Boege, V. et al. (2008). On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State 
Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’. Berghof Handbook. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1994). Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic 
Field. Sociological Theory, (12)1: 1-18. 
  
Burnham, P. (2003). State. In: McLean, Ian and McMillan, A (eds.). The Oxford 
Concise Dictionary of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde. J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. 
  
Casinelli, C. W. (1961). Political Authority: Its Exercise and Possession. The 
Western Political Quarterly, 14(3): 635-646. 
 
Chandler, D. (2006). Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building. London: Pluto 
Press. 
  
Dahl, R. A. (2006). On Political Equality. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Delbrück, J. (2003). Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational 
Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies? Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, 10(1): 29-43. 
  
Dogan, M. (2002). Conceptions of Legitimacy. In: Hawkesworth, M., Kogan, M. 
(eds), Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics, Volume I. Taylor & Francis e-
Library.  
  
Doornbos, M. (2010). Researching African Statehood Dynamics: Negotiability and 
its Limits. Development and Change, 41(4): 747–769. 
  
Duffield, M. (2001). Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of 
Development and Security. London and New York: Zed Books. 
Florian Weigand  22 
  
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
  
Elias, N. (1982 [1939]). The Civilising Process – Volume 2: State Formation and 
Civilization. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the State Back In. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
  
Friedrichs, J. (2010). The privatization of force and its consequences – Unintended 
but not unpredictable. In: Daase, C. and Friesendorf, C. (eds.): Rethinking Security 
Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences. London/New York: 
Routledge. 
  
Fukuyama, F. (2004). State-Building - Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century. Ithaca, New York: Profile Books. 
  
Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace 
Research, 6(3): 167-191. 
  
George, L. G. and Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
  
Gerring, J. (2012). Mere Description. British Journal of Political Science, 42: 721-
746. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123412000130. 
  
Gerring, J. (2007). Case Study Research - Principles and Practices. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
  
Gilley, B. (2006). The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 
countries. European Journal of Political Research 45: 499–525. 
 
Goertz, G. and Mahoney, J. (2012). ‘Concepts and measurement: ontology and 
epistemology’. Social Science Information 51 (2). 
  
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selection from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International 
Publishers.  
  
Hagmann, T. and Péclard, D. (2010). Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power 
and Domination in Africa. Development and Change, 41(4): 539–562. 
 
Hansen, T.B. and Stepputat, F. (2001). Introduction: States of Imagination. 
In: Hansen, T.B. and Stepputat, F. (eds): States of Imagination. Ethnographic 
Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Durham, London: Duke University Press. 
  
Hertz, J. (1978). Legitimacy, can we retrieve it? Comparative Politics, 10(3): 317–
43. 
  
Hoffmann, K. and Kirk, T. (2013). Public Authority and the Provision of Public 
Florian Weigand  23 
Goods in Conflict-Affected and Transitioning Regions. JSRP Paper, 7. London: LSE. 
 
Levite, A. and Tarrow, S. (1983). The Legitimation of Excluded Parties in Dominant 
Party Systems: A Comparison of Israel and Italy. Comparative Politics, 15(3): 295-
327. 
 
Jackson, J. et al. (2013). Monopolizing force? Police legitimacy and public attitudes 
towards the acceptability of violence. Psychology, public policy and law. 
  
Jackson, J. and Bradford, B. (undated). Political Legitimacy 
 
Jackson, P. (2011). Security Sector Reform and State Building. Third World 
Quarterly, 32(10): 1803-1822.  
 
Jackson, R.H. (1990). Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  
Kaldor, M. and Selchow, S. (forthcoming). How to critically assess international 
interventions into conflicts? Introducing the ‘security gap’ as an empirical focus in the 
study of international security. 
  
Kaldor, M. (2009). The reconstruction of political authority in a global era. In: 
Kostovicova, Denisa and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna (eds.). Persistent State Weakness 
in the Global Age. Ashgate: Surrey, UK. 
  
Kaldor, M. (2006). New and Old Wars. Cambridge: Polity. 
  
Kalyvas, S. N. (2001). "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? World 
Politics, 54 (1): 99-118. 
 
Keen, D. (2008). Complex Emergencies. Cambridge: Polity. 
  
Krasner, S.D. and Risse, T. (2014). External Actors, State-Building, and Service 
Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction. Governance: An International 
Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 27(4): 1-23. 
  
Kuhn, T. (2000 [1989]). ‘The natural and the human sciences’. In: Conant, James and 
Haugeland, John (eds.). The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
  
Lemay-Hébert, N. (2013). Rethinking Weberian Approaches to Statebuilding. In: 
Chandler, D and Sisk, T. (eds). Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding. 
Routledge Studies in Intervention and Statebuilding, Routledge. 
 
Lemay-Hébert, N. (2009). Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State 
Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach. Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding, 3(1): 21-45. 
 
Luckham, R. and Kirk, T. (2012). Security in Hybrid Political Contexts: An End-
User Approach. JSRP Paper, 2. London: LSE. 
Florian Weigand  24 
 
Lund, C. (2006). Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa. 
Development and Change, 37(4): 685-705.  
  
Machiavelli, N. (1661). also, The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca, and The 
meanes Duke Valentine us'd to put to death Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto of Fermo, 
Paul, and the Duke of Gravina. 
  
Mazerolle, L. et al. (2013). Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review. Campbell 
Systematic Reviews 2013:1. The Campbell Collaboration. 
 
Menkhaus, K. (2006/2007). Governance without Government in Somalia – Spoilers, 
State Building, and the Politics of Coping. International Security, 31(3): 74-106. 
 
Migdal, J. S. and Schlichte, K. (2005). Rethinking the State. In: Schlichte, Klaus 
(ed.). The Dynamics of States - The Formation and Crises of State Domination. 
Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate. 
  
Migdal, Joel S. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and 
State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Miliband, R. (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books. 
  
Moser, C. O. N. (2007). Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory 
Roadmap. Environment & Urbanization, 16(2): 3-16. 
  
Moses, J. W. and Torbjørn, L.K. (2007). Ways of Knowing: Competing 
Methodologies in Social and Political Research, Basingstoke. 
  
Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained Methodological: 
Implications of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods. Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research, 1(48). 
 
North, D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W W 
Norton & Company.  
 
OECD (2010). Do not Harm: International Support for Statebuilding. Series: Conflict 
and Fragility.  
 
Dictionary (2014). Legitimacy. Available 
at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legitimacy?q=legitimacy. 
  
Pauly, L. W. and Grande, E. (2005). Reconstituting Political Authority: Sovereignty, 
Effectiveness, and Legitimacy in a Transnational Order. In: Grande, Edgar and Pauly, 
Louis W. (eds.). Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the 
Twenty-first Century. Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press. 
  
Pinker, S. (2011). The Better Angels of our Future - Why Violence has Declined. 
London. 
  
Florian Weigand  25 
Putzel, J. and Di John, J. (2012). Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States. London: 
Crisis States Research Centre. Available 
at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/fin
alreport/Meeting-the-Challenges-of-Crisis-States.pdf. 
  
Putzel, J. (2010). Why Development Actors Need a Better Definition of 'State 
Fragility'. London: Crisis States Research Centre.  
  
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA. 
  
Reed, I. A. (2010). Epistemology contextualized: social-scientific knowledge in a 
postpositivist era. Sociological Theory 28 (1). 
  
Reiter, B. (2006). The Hermeneutic Foundations of Qualitative Research. Qualitative 
Methods, 4(2): 18-24. 
  
Renders, M. and Terlinden, U. (2010). Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political 
Order: The Case of Somaliland. Development and Change, 41(4): 723–746. 
  
Ridenour, C. and Newman, I. (2008). Mixed Methods Research: Exploring the 
Interactive Continuum, US. 
  
Rotberg, R. (2004): “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, 
Prevention, and Repair”. In Rotberg, R. (ed.): When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
  
Rubin, B. R. (2006a). Constructing sovereignty for security. Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy, 47(4): 93-106. 
  
Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Economic integration, democracy and the welfare 
state. Journal of European Public Policy, (4)1: 18-36. 
  
Schmelzle, C. (2011). Evaluating Governance. Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas 
of Limited Statehood. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 26, Research 
Center (SFB) 700, Berlin. 
  
Schneckener, U. (2007). Internationales Statebuilding – Dilemmata, Strategien und 
Anforderungen an die deutsche Politik. SWP Studie 10. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik (SWP). 
 
Scott, J.C. (1985). Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. 
Yale University.   
  
Skogstad, G. (2003). Who Governs? Who Should Govern? Political Authority and 
Legitimacy in Canada in the Twenty-First Century. Canadian Journal of Political 
Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 36(5): 955-973. 
 
Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD990-1992. Blackwell: 
Oxford. 
  
Florian Weigand  26 
Thomson, S. et al. (2013). Introduction: Why Stories Behind the Findings? In: 
Thomson, Susan et al. (eds.): Emotional and Ethical Challenges for Field Research in 
Africa. The Story Behind the Findings. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
  
Tyler, T. R. (2004). Enhancing Police Legitimacy. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 593(1): 84-99. 
 
von Clausewitz, C. (1873 [1832-1834]). On War. 
Online: http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html. 
  
Wacquant, Loic J.D. (1996). Foreword. In: Bourdieu, Pierre. The State Nobility. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Weber, M. (2011 [1904]). “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy. In Shils, 
E. A. and Finch, H. A. (eds.). Methodology of Social Sciences. Transaction 
Publishers: New Brunswick. 
  
Weber, M. (2009a). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die 
gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. Teilband 4: Herrschaft. 
Studienausgabe der Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe Band I/22-4. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck. 
  
Weber, M. (2009b [1948]). Politics as a Vocation. In Turner, B.S. (ed.): From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology - Edited, with an Introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills – With a New Preface by Bryan S. Turner. London: Routledge.  
  
Weber, M. (2004 [1904]). The “objectivity” of knowledge in social science and 
social policy’. In: Whimster S. (ed.): The Essential Weber: A Reader, London. 
 
Weber, M. (1980 [1921]). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Verstehenden 
Soziologie. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Siebeck). 
  
Weber, M. (1964). The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: 
The Free Press.  
  
Wendt, A. (1998). ‘On constitution and causation in international relations’. Review 
of International Studies 24 (5). 
  
Wissenburg, M. (2008). Political pluralism and the state: beyond sovereignty. 
London: Routledge. 
 
World Bank (2011). World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security, and 
Development. Washington DC: World Bank. 
  
Zartman, I. W. (1995). Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. 
  
 
